In Ansley v. Wetzel, 21 cv 528 M.D. Pennsylvania, the plaintiff filed suit against prison guards for violations of his civil rights. Plaintiff sought to obtain video evidence of the incident but the video was lost. He moved for sanctions under 37, but his motion was denied because the tapes of the incident were lost prior to suit being filed.

The Defendants argued that there was no spoliation because they had no reason to retain the tapes because there was no use of force. The District court agreed with their argument:

Defendants submitted the declarations of Captain Jeffrey Madden and Captain Robert Bookheimer wherein they explain when video footage is retained at state correctional institutions. (Doc. 91-2 at 10-11, Madden Declaration ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 91-2 at 12-13, Bookheimer Declaration ¶ 3). Captain Madden explained that video footage is typically recorded over when a camera’s memory capacity has been met, unless the video involved a planned or unplanned use of force. (Doc. 91-2 at 10-11, Madden Decl. ¶¶ 3-4). Captain Bookheimer further declared that video footage of an inmate’s escort to the RHU is generally not retained, unless in the event of an extraordinary occurrence report or other event deemed necessary by the Facility Manager. (Doc. 91-2 at 12-13, Bookheimer Decl. ¶ 3). The video footage at issue was not retained because the incidents did not involve either a planned or unplanned use of force, and there is no evidence that Ansley’s escort to the RHU involved an event triggering retention of the video.

“When a party argues that spoliation occurred before the complaint was filed, the court must conduct a fact-sensitive inquiry to determine at what point the spoliating party reasonably should have anticipated the litigation.” Bistrian, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 468. Ansley states that defendants should have been aware of impending litigation based on two grievances he filed on October 9, 2020, related to a “rape plot” fabricated by defendants. (Doc. 89 at 10; Doc. 89-1 at 38). However, the filing of these grievances does not support a pre-litigation duty to preserve recordings. Such an obligation arises when a party reasonably should have anticipated litigation concerning the grieved incidents. Bistrian, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 468 (“A party `is under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, will likely be requested in reasonably foreseeable litigation.”). Based on the filing of grievances related to a rape plot, defendants could not have reasonably anticipated litigation concerning the escort to the RHU on June 25, 2020, an incident involving masturbation on January 10, 2021, and the escort to the psychiatric observation cell on March 18, 2021. Because defendants could not reasonably foresee litigation and appreciate that the video footage at issue should be preserved for possible use in that litigation, they were not under a duty to preserve the video footage.

Conclusion: there as no duty to preserve evidence under Rule 37(e) before the lawsuit was brought.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

In Jingdong Logistics United States Company v. Ready Acquisition, Inc, Case No. 5:22-cv-01018-ODW (SHKx), Central District of California, plaintiff alleged that Ready Acquisition was the alter ego of its two owners. The owners alleged that the allegations were baseless and sought Rule 11 sanctions. The court denied sanctions by reasoning that there was an adequate factual and legal basis for the alter ego claim.

Here, the Court finds that the alter ego allegations in Jingdong’s Complaint were neither factually nor legally baseless “at the time that the position [was] adopted,” that is, at the time Jingdong filed its Complaint. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986). In reaching this conclusion, the Court “avoid[s] using the wisdom of hindsight,” limiting its inquiry to whether a reasonable basis for alter ego allegations existed at the time the Complaint was filed, regardless of what Jingdong learned or discovered after it filed the Complaint. Id. at 1537 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment).

Prior to filing the Complaint, Jingdong’s attorneys investigated Ready Acquisition by sending a field agent to Ready Acquisition’s registered principal office address and to Lawrance’s personal address. (See Decl. Sijiu Ren ISO Opp’n (“Ren Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-5, ECF No. 22-1.) In so doing, Jingdong discovered that (1) Ready Acquisition’s office was occupied by new tenants, and that (2) packages addressed to Ready Acquisition were located on the front porch of Lawrance’s residence. (Id.; Decl. Greg Lawrance ISO Reply (“Lawrance Decl.”) ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 28.) Jingdong’s attorneys conducted additional research and determined that Ready Acquisition’s business status in the State of New Hampshire was “Not In Good Standing.” (Ren Decl. Ex. A (“Business Information Inquiry”), ECF No. 22-2; Ren Decl. ¶ 6.) These discoveries provided Jingdong’s counsel with a reasonable factual basis for including alter ego allegations against Lawrance and Gunter in Jingdong’s Complaint.

Lawrance and Gunter argue otherwise, pointing to facts and developments that occurred after Jingdong filed its Complaint, (Mot. 6-8), but these facts are not relevant to whether the Court should sanction Jingdong for allegations made in the Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b); Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1538.

Lawrance and Gunter further argue that Jingdong is withholding $400,000 of Ready Acquisition’s inventory and thus contributing to the very insolvency Jingdong alleges supports alter ego liability. (Reply 5.) This argument is not well taken because there is no actual evidence of a causal link between Jingdong’s withholding of inventory and Ready Acquisition’s purported insolvency; and in any case, this attack on one component of Jingdong’s alter ego theory, even if successful, would not render the alter ego theory factually or legally baseless.

The court also held that the legal theory did not merit sanctions either.

Comment: Plaintiff did an extensive investigation of the facts before it brought the alter ego claim. That investigation and the facts that were discovered was a sufficient basis to bring an alter ego claim.

http://www.clintonlaw.net

A district court in Florida has utilized Rule 37 to enter judgment in favor of an insurance company against a defendant accused of engaging in wrongful billing practices. Government Employees Insurance Co. v. DeJesus, No. 20-21558 (S.D. Florida 2022). The defendant’s refusal to appear for his deposition was the deciding factor in the grant of the Rule 37 sanctions motion. The court explained in part that:

“The Defendants initially agreed to appear for a deposition on October 14, 2021. However, on October 8, 2021, Defendants’ counsel, Christian Carrazana, Esq., informed Plaintiffs of his intent to file a motion to withdraw as counsel for Defendants. Plaintiffs indicated that they would consent, but informed Mr. Carrazana that they intended to proceed with the Defendants’ depositions on October 14, 2021, should the motion to withdraw not be decided by then. Mr. Carrazana did not move to withdraw until November 30, 2021, and the Defendants did not appear at their October 14, 2021, depositions. Thereafter, Plaintiffs requested a discovery hearing seeking Rule 37 sanctions and an order compelling Defendants to appear for their depositions. See [D.E. 164 and 165].

The Court held a discovery hearing on December 2, 2021, and entered an Order compelling Defendants to appear for depositions to be held on December 20, 2021. [D.E 186]. The Order also warned Defendants that additional violations of the Court’s directives could subject them more severe sanctions:

Defendants’ failure to comply with this Order may result in further sanctions under Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules, which can include further monetary sanctions, fines, or even entry of default judgment against Defendants on all claims and for all damages sought in the pending complaint. Defendants’ failure to comply may also result in their being found in contempt of court, which finding may result in the entry of any Order necessary for the enforcement of the Court’s jurisdiction to coerce compliance.

Id. at ¶ 5. The Court also granted Mr. Carrazana’s motion to withdraw that same day, ordering Defendants to retain new counsel by December 16, 2021,^[2] and explaining that “[f]ailure to retain substitute counsel for the corporate entity Defendant, or failure to file the notice of intention to defend the case on a pro se basis by the individual Defendant, may be deemed a waiver of the right to defend the action and result in entry of default judgment(s).” [D.E. 187].

Contrary to the Court’s Orders, Defendants never retained new counsel, and Mr. Collazo never informed the Court of his intention to proceed with his defense on a pro se basis. Further, as prescribed by the December 2, 2021, Order, Plaintiff’s’ counsel shared with Mr. Carranza the link to Defendants’ virtual depositions taking place on December 20, 2021, but Defendants did not appear, nor did they provide any justification to Plaintiff for their absence. [D.E. 195-1, ¶¶ 5-7].

Defendants’ willful and unjustified disregard for this Court’s Orders makes the sanction of default judgment appropriate here. Not only have Defendants failed to pursue their defense in this action, but they have also failed to comply with this Court’s instructions on repeated occasions and without any explanation.”

In NPF Franchising, LLC v. Sy Dawgs, LLC 37 F.4th 369 (6th Cir. 2022), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a Rule 37 sanctions award against the lawyers for NPF Franchising. The fees were awarded against NPF and the individual lawyers because the lawyers failed to comply with discovery obligations in the case, a dispute between an franchisor and a franchisee. I have quoted from the relevant portions of the opinion below.

“This case began in February 2018 with NPF’s complaint against SY Dawgs for breach of their franchise agreement and non-competition and non-disclosure agreement. About a week later, NPF amended its complaint. After the district court denied NPF’s motion for a preliminary injunction, NPF amended the complaint for a second time. SY Dawgs then moved for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses, pursuant to a contractual fee-shifting provision.^[1] SY Dawgs argued that it was entitled to monetary compensation because NPF was the “unsuccessful party” on its claim for injunctive relief. The district court denied the motion without prejudice as premature.

374*374 Around this time, in August 2018, NPF failed to appear at a status conference. At that conference, the district court noted that despite SY Dawgs having issued multiple subpoenas and responded to NPF’s discovery requests, NPF had thus far refused to respond to SY Dawgs’s discovery requests, with the discovery deadline two months away. SY Dawgs again moved for costs and fees, this time over NPF’s non-attendance at the status conference. At the next status conference, on September 4, 2018, new counsel, the Buchalter Law Firm, appeared for NPF and vowed to produce all outstanding discovery. The district court granted motions to appear pro hac vice on behalf of NPF filed by Buchalter Law Firm attorneys Tracy Warren and Kathryn Fox around this time.

Later in September, SY Dawgs again moved to compel discovery and for sanctions. It stated that NPF had provided no interrogatory answers or documents in response to the requests that it served on June 20, 2018. SY Dawgs also noted that NPF refused to designate a representative for corporate representative depositions. The parties then had a status conference in early October, where NPF represented to the district court that it had turned over all the requested discovery. Relying on this representation, the district court denied SY Dawgs’s motion for costs and fees but also expressed willingness to revisit the issue later. The district court also granted SY Dawgs’s motion to compel discovery “inasmuch as [NPF]’s counsel has represented to Court and counsel that all requested information has been disclosed.”

SY Dawgs moved for discovery sanctions yet again on October 25, 2018. It stated that NPF had failed to appear for a properly noticed deposition or produce any documents related to a subpoena. SY Dawgs also accused NPF of misrepresenting to the district court that it had produced all documents, given that it had later produced several hundred more documents. The district court then granted a motion by NPF to extend discovery, held another status conference at which it noted that SY Dawgs’s motion for sanctions was fully briefed, and asked the parties to confer and prepare a list of documents still needed. Soon after, it extended discovery again, this time until March 1, 2019.

The new discovery deadline brought yet another motion from SY Dawgs to compel discovery, filed at the end of December. In addition to alleging that NPF had provided insufficient or incomplete responses to several of SY Dawgs’s requests, SY Dawgs argued that NPF had provided no documents responsive to the 45 other requests. That same day, Buchalter Law Firm attorneys Rick Waltman and J. Patrick Allen were admitted pro hac vice to represent NPF. And NPF made its own motion to compel discovery and sanction SY Dawgs. It alleged that SY Dawgs had failed to supplement its prior discovery responses and that doing so was a “willful and concerted effort to avoid the discovery process.” The district court denied both parties’ motions for discovery sanctions, but it left the sanctions issue open for revisitation after litigation concluded. And, yet again, the court granted SY Dawgs’s motion to compel discovery. It also instructed NPF to respond to the discovery requests within 14 days or, in the alternative, certify to the district court that there is nothing responsive left to produce.

The 14-day deadline passed with no such certification from NPF. In February 2019, SY Dawgs renewed its motion for sanctions. It stated that “NPF and its pro hac vice-admitted counsel” had a “pattern of ignoring discovery obligations” and “flagrantly” ignoring both court orders compelling discovery. Def.’s Renewed Mot. for Sanctions, R. 161, PageID 3606. The district 375*375 court granted the motion, ordering NPF to file an affidavit certifying that it had fully complied with the discovery request and also ordering NPF’s counsel to file a “similar certification of compliance by counsel.” The district court warned that “[f]ailure to comply with this Order will result in sanctions, up to and including dismissal of Plaintiff’s action.” And it warned yet again that “any monetary sanctions for Plaintiff’s repeated discovery intransigence will be addressed at the conclusion of this action.”

Despite that admonition, NPF never complied. So, SY Dawgs moved for the ultimate sanction—to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. In the meantime, NPF moved for an interlocutory appeal of the sanctions order before our court. But NPF later voluntarily dismissed the appeal, and SY Dawgs renewed its motion to dismiss. NPF also sought a writ of mandamus from our circuit, stating that it would be “irreparably harmed” by “fully respond[ing] to all of Respondents’ discovery requests.” Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, R. 180, PageID 4054.^[2] Yet no protective order regarding these documents was sought by NPF from the district court, nor did the franchisor ever produce a privilege log. We denied the petition for mandamus. Finally, NPF moved for default judgment, stating that SY Dawgs was misrepresenting its efforts to cooperate with the court’s orders and communicate.

After this last flurry of motions, NPF moved to voluntarily dismiss the case with prejudice in July 2019. The district court granted its request. But just before the dismissal, SY Dawgs moved again for attorneys’ fees and costs.”

The District Court sanctioned four individual lawyers, their law firm and the client.

Because Rule 37 does not allow sanctions against a law firm, that portion of the sanctions award was reversed. However, the sanctions were upheld against the individual lawyers.

The lawyers argued on appeal that they had not received sufficient notice of the sanctions and had not had an opportunity to respond. The Sixth Circuit rejected both arguments. The lawyers argued that their position was “substantially justified” but the court did not accept that argument either.

Comment: In my opinion, this is a case where emotions got the better of the lawyers for NPF. No matter how you may feel about a case or the position of the other side, you must comply with court orders to answer discovery requests. If you work for a firm that appears to be headed down this path, consult ethics counsel before engaging in this behavior. It is unfortunate that the junior lawyers did not engage counsel to defend themselves. Their defense might have been different than the defense offered by their more senior colleagues.

If you have a question about ethics or discovery obligations and you do not know what to do, please call us. We can often help resolve messy situations if we have time to give advice.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

The Clinton Law Firm, LLC

Chicago, Illinois 60602

312.357.1515