The case, Centrella v. Ritz-Craft Corporation, 16-729- cv, decided by the Second Circuit on November 5, 2019 (unpublished) allowed a party to present an undisclosed opinion of its expert at trial despite a motion to exclude that opinion. The district court took active measures to allow the other side to cross-examine and rebut the opinion. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment.
Ritz-Craft argues that the district court erred by permitting the Centrellas’ expert, James Bradley, to testify regarding an opinion that Bradley did not include in his expert report. The district court responded to Bradley’s undisclosed testimony by permitting Ritz-Craft to cross-examine Bradley on his undisclosed testimony and allowing Ritz-Craft’s expert to rebut Bradley’s undisclosed testimony.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 permits the court to sanction a party that fails to make the disclosures that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). “A district court has wide discretion to impose sanctions, including severe sanctions, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, and its ruling will be reversed only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284, 294 (2d Cir. 2006). We consider four factors to determine whether the district court’s Rule 37 sanctions in this case were an abuse of discretion: “(1) the party’s explanation for the failure to comply with the disclosure requirement; (2) the importance of the testimony . . .; (3) the prejudice suffered by the opposing party as a result of having to prepare to meet the new testimony; and (4) the possibility of a continuance.” Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Centrellas have not offered any explanation for their failure to disclose Bradley’s opinion prior to his testimony, and the testimony, an expert’s opinion that Ritz-Craft modular homes could not meet Vermont energy code because of a design flaw, was certainly important to the case. These factors support a strong sanction. However, Ritz-Craft agrees in its brief on appeal that the trial court’s “effort[] in permitting Ritz-Craft’s experts to testify on this issue was sufficient to cure any error,” Appellant’s Br. at 30, and there is no indication that Ritz-Craft sought a continuance to meet the testimony. Given these considerations, the district court acted within its substantial discretion by permitting Ritz-Craft to cross-examine Bradley on his undisclosed testimony and permitting Ritz-Craft’s expert to offer an opinion in response.
This is an interesting opinion, which cannot be cited because it was unpublished. It does offer a pathway for a lawyer who mistakenly omits an opinion to correct that error at trial.
Ed Clinton, Jr.
fedcivilprocedure 