Category: Deposition Issues

District Court Allows Expedited Discovery Where Plaintiff Concerned that Defendant is Hiding Assets


The case is captioned Tungsten Heavy Powder and Parts v. Khem Precision Machining, 17 cv 1882 (S.D. California).

This is a collection case where Tungsten sued Khem for payment for certain tungsten buffer weights. Tungsten sued and requested expedited discovery because it was concerned that the defendant was actively taking measures to dispose of its assets to frustrate the collection action. Normally, under Rule 26(f) discovery does not commence until the parties have had a chance to have a Rule 26 meeting concerning discovery. Tungsten argued that it could not wait that long to obtain discovery into the defendant’s finances and accounting records. The court found that the balance of the factors favored expedited discovery because Tungsten requested financial records and one deposition to determine if the Defendant was wrongfully hiding assets.

The explanation:

The Court finds that the balance of factors favors Tungsten. First, there is no motion for preliminary injunction pending, which weighs against Tungsten. However, Tungsten has a need to determine whether injunctive relief is necessary to ensure Khem does not improperly dispose of its assets. See Interserve, Inc. v. Fusion Garage PTE, Ltd., No. C09-5812-JQ(PVT), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6395, at *7, 2010 WL 143665, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2010) (“Expedited discovery will allow plaintiff to determine whether to seek an early injunction.”). Preliminary injunctions have been granted in this District in such circumstances. See, e.g., Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Nagby, No. 16-CV-3038-BTM(WVG), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165582, 2017 WL 4432453 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2017). Second, the discovery requested is limited to only one deposition and information related to any efforts by Khem to dispose of assets. Third, the deposition and documents sought are narrowly tailored to determining whether Khem has or plans to dispose of assets to prevent any recovery in this litigation. Fourth, the burden on Khem is relatively minimal. Tungsten requests a single deposition and documents that are readily obtainable and, as Khem acknowledges, would have to be produced in the normal course of the litigation. Any burden on Khem is outweighed by the interests of justice. Fifth, discovery in the normal course will commence in the next few months given that Khem has filed an Answer and a combined Early Neutral Evaluation and Case Management Conference has been scheduled. Thus, while the instant request for discovery is early, it is not extraordinarily so. This factor favors neither party.

Expedited discovery can be a useful tool in a collection case filed in federal court. (It is doubtful that expedited discovery could be obtained in any action filed in the courts of the State of Illinois).

This tool is worth considering if you have the right case and the balance of the factors favors your client.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

The Clinton Law Firm, LLC

Effort to Sanction United States Under Rule 30(b)(6) Fails


Rule 30(b)(6) allows a party to serve a deposition notice on an organization and the organization must tender a witness who can answer questions. The party serving the notice sets forth the issues it will cover in the deposition and the responding party is required to identify and produce a witness who has knowledge of said matters.

In this case, the United States tendered a Rule 30(b)(6) witness, but the plaintiff claimed that the witness was a “Know Nothing Witness” who did not provide useful information. The court rejected that argument and denied the sanctions motion and explained:

Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Whitaker was not prepared for his RCFC 30(b)(6) deposition. When asked to explain how he had prepared for the RCFC 30(b)(6) deposition, Mr. Whitaker stated that he had seen the list of plaintiff’s RCFC 30(b)(6) deposition topics only the day before his deposition, and that, in order to familiarize himself with the topics, he looked at each one of the admissions and the spreadsheets produced by defendant in discovery. Mr. Whitaker also testified that he had not thoroughly reviewed the contract between Securiforce and DLA Energy before his deposition.

Plaintiff points to different statements made by Mr. Whitaker during his RCFC 30(b)(6) deposition to demonstrate that the “government’s designated witness, Mr. Whitaker, had no firsthand knowledge concerning the specified topics and had undertaken no investigation as to what was `reasonably known to the organization.'” Specifically, Mr. Whitaker testified that he had no personal knowledge as to whether fuel was delivered to any of Securiforce’s sites between September 7, 2011 and October 24, 2011, and that his knowledge regarding specific fuel deliveries was based on the information contained in the spreadsheets that were produced to plaintiff in July 2013. When asked about the process for ordering and delivering fuel in Iraq, however, Mr. Whitaker articulated a developed understanding of this process and its nuances, including how the process could be different based on the source of the fuel. Furthermore, Mr. Whitaker was able to testify to the information contained in defendant’s response to interrogatory 16, including the data systems used to compile the spreadsheets.

The transcript of Mr. Whitaker’s deposition demonstrates that he offered a thorough knowledge of the spreadsheets prepared by DLA and previously turned over to plaintiff. The spreadsheets purportedly captured the fuel deliveries to the Securiforce Department of State sites in Iraq during the relevant time period according to defendant’s information when the spreadsheets were prepared. Mr. Whitaker stated that he was familiar with the various databases listed on the spreadsheets, including “DLA Energy’s fuels enterprise server, DLA Energy’s defense fuel, automated management system, and DLA Energy’s automated voucher examination and dispersing system” and was able to explain the systems to plaintiff’s counsel when asked. The dialogue contained in the deposition transcript indicates that Mr. Whitaker could speak intelligently about the information contained in the spreadsheets. Mr. Whitaker answered many questions posed by plaintiff’s counsel about specific, detailed information contained in the spreadsheets based on his ability to decipher the spreadsheets. Specifically, Mr. Whitaker could read the codes used in the spreadsheets to identify countries of origin, invoice numbers, billing codes, delivery sites, delivery dates, funding codes, stock numbers, fuel quantities, and fuel grades. Mr. Whitaker’s knowledgeable deposition testimony about the spreadsheets and fuel deliveries in Iraq indicates that he was prepared to discuss a broad range of the topics plaintiff included in the RCFC 30(b)(6) deposition notice based on the information contained in DLA Energy’s records.

…

It is clear from Mr. Whitaker’s deposition testimony that, although he could not provide specific details for all of plaintiff’s counsel’s questions, he testified about information reasonably known by the government, based on DLA Energy’s records, and was responsive to a significant portion of plaintiff’s identified RCFC 30(b)(6) topics. Because Mr. Whitaker testified knowledgably about the DLA-prepared spreadsheets, and the information contained therein, his deposition testimony as a RCFC 30(b)(6) witness was not such that he was, as alleged by plaintiff, a “No-show” witness. Moreover, it would be hard to argue that only one witness could have testified to DLA Energy headquarters’ records and whether onsite deliveries in the conflict theater of Iraq actually occurred, as well as to possible fuel deliveries by the Army. The government offered to provide additional RCFC 30(b)(6) witnesses, and identified possible further witnesses, but plaintiff declined to depose any additional witnesses who could speak to the onsite fuel deliveries in Iraq. Instead, plaintiff chose to file its motion for sanctions and seek monetary compensation.

The case is interesting because it shows what work must be done by the party producing the Rule 30(b)(6) witness to make sure the witness knows what he is talking about. Source: SECURIFORCE INTERNATIONAL AMERICA, LLC v. US, Court of Federal Claims 2016 – Google Scholar

Jones Day Sanctions Order – Lawyer Sanctioned For Tedious Objections At Deposition – But Eighth Circuit Reverses Sanction


Jones Day Sanctions Order.

This is a lengthy opinion by a federal district court judge, Mark W. Bennett, in which he sanctions a Jones Day lawyer for excessive and tedious objections at a deposition. In writing the opinion, Bennett is clearly out to reform the entire discovery process. He writes: “Discovery-a process intended to facilitate the free flow of information between parties – is now too often mired in obstructionism. Today’s ‘litigators’ are quick to dispute discovery requests, slow to produce documents, and all-too-eager to object at every stage of the process.” He also criticizes judges for ignoring this misconduct and encouraging obstructionist tactics. He argues that the judiciary should step up to the plate and sanction obstructionist lawyers. “Obstructionist litigators, like Ivan Pavlov’s dogs, salivate when they see discovery requests and are conditioned to unleash their treasure chest of obstructive weaponry. Unlike Pavlov’s dogs, their rewards are not food but successfully blocking or impeding the flow of discoverable information. Unless judges impose serious adverse consequences, like court-imposed sanctions, litigators’ conditional reflexes will persist. The point of court-imposed sanctions is to stop reinforcing winning through obstruction.”

As an aside, I agree with Judge Bennett. There are too many objections and delays in the discovery process. That conduct slows down the court system and wastes resources. Judges who urge lawyers to meet and work it out need to remember that some lawyers won’t produce, no matter what happens. In Chicago, the most difficult firms to work with are often the so-called litigation boutiques.

In any event, Judge Bennett sanctioned a Jones Day lawyer for obstructionist conduct during depositions. First, the lawyer used speaking objections when questions were asked to disrupt the flow of questions and answers. Second, the lawyer excessively used what are known as “form” objections. Third, Judge Bennett concluded that the lawyer was using the objections to coach the witness on what to say.

Specifically, Judge Bennett found that the form objections were a waste of time and were not necessary. Furthermore, the form objections did not explain what the problem was so that the questioner could cure the problem. As the court explained, “counsel’s ‘form’ objections, however, amplified two other issues: witness coaching and excessive interruptions.” Page 17.  The court found that certain objections were used to coach the witness not to answer questions. Judge Bennett objected to the use of “vague and ambiguous” as an objection because it was used to coach the witness to refuse to answer on the ground that the question called for speculation.

Judge Bennett objected to objections such as “You can answer if you know.” He is correct to find this conduct sanctionable. Those type of objections are designed to coach witnesses to give certain types of answers.

The sanction ordered is that the lawyer make a video discussing proper deposition conduct. I think the sanction is very odd, given the behavior, but Judge Bennett is on to something – lawyers should not be coaching witnesses during a deposition.

Update: the Eighth Circuit reversed the ruling on the ground that the sanction was inappropriate and out of line.

The court was concerned about (a) the lack of any complaint from the other side’s attorneys (b) the lengthy delay before sanctions were imposed; and (c) the failure to notify Ghezzi that sanctions were being considered.  The Court explained its ruling in this abstract:

“Then, sixteen months after defense counsel participated in the Bottock and Barrett-Reis depositions, one year after fact discovery had closed, and nine months after Abbott had moved for summary judgment based on excerpts of key depositions, the trial judge assumed control of the case for the first time and criticized defense counsel’s deposition conduct. Seven months later she was sanctioned under Rule 30(d)(2)—some two years after she had defended the Bottock and Barrett-Reis depositions without complaint from opposing counsel or inquiry by the magistrate judge. Cf. Manual for Complex Litigation § 11.42; Federal Judicial Center, Civil Litigation Management Manual, Ch. 3 (2d ed. 2010).

With few exceptions, sanctions should be imposed “within a time frame that has a nexus to the behavior sought to be deterred.” Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 881 (5th Cir. 1988); cf. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 395-96. Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions assessed near the time of violation deter both ongoing and subsequent abuses. See Craig, 384 F. App’x at 533. Prompt action “helps enhance the credibility of the rule,” and by deterring further discovery abuse, “achieve its therapeutic purpose.” Cf. Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1183-84. This is especially true when sanctions are imposed sua sponte after the fact, for delay allows potential violations to pass unchecked and undeterred. E.g., Thomas, 836 F.3d at 881. The primary purpose of Rule 30(d)(2) was not well served by the post hoc procedures here. See Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1184 (concluding that “the benefit provided by the policy of deterrence is lost if the [district court] postpones imposition of [discovery sanctions] until the end of the case”); see alsoCraig, 384 F. App’x at 533….”

The court discussed the failure to notify counsel in this passage:

“

Here, there was no real notice of the nature of the sanction the court had in mind. While the trial judge did provide defense counsel advance notice of his reasons for considering sanctions under Rule 30(d)(2), nothing was mentioned about their unusual nature requiring counsel to produce and distribute an instructional video addressing the impropriety of unspecified form objections, witness coaching, and excessive interruptions. Nor were any “probable consequences” discussed at the subsequent sanctions hearing. See Fisher, 526 F.2d at 1343. The nature of the sanction became apparent only in the court’s final published opinion in the matter. See In re Tutu Wells, 120 F.3d at 380; see also In re Prudential, 278 F.3d at 192-93.

Once information about an unusual sanction appears in public, the damage to the subject’s career, reputation, and future professional opportunities can be difficult if not impossible to repair. See Adams v. Ford Motor Co., 653 F.3d 299, 308-09 (3d Cir. 2011). Defense counsel’s reputation was one of her “most important professional assets,” see id. at 305, and the district court’s unusual sanction might leave an indelible and deleterious “black mark” on her career, see In re Tutu Wells, 120 F.3d at 381 n.10.”

The Eighth Circuit opinion can be found at this link. https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13463882856548559569&q=June+k.+ghezzi&hl=en&as_sdt=400006&as_ylo=2015

Comment: the sanction imposed by the District Court was harsh and unusual punishment. It is noteworthy that the Eighth Circuit did not vindicate the conduct of the attorney who made the tedious objections at the deposition. In my experience tedious objections of this sort are used to coach witnesses on how to answer questions and should be prohibited.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

Court Revokes Pro Hac Vice Admission For Witness Related Misconduct


HomeDIRECT, INC. v. HEP DIRECT, INC., Dist. Court, ND Illinois 2013 – Google Scholar.

This is a case where Judge Zagel of the Northern District of Illinois revoked the pro hac vice admission of a lawyer to practice before him.

The lawyer and his client were accused of attempting to influence a witness in a civil case by canceling a debt the witness purportedly owed to the client. The lawyer and the client vigorously disputed the allegations, but, after a fact hearing, Judge Zagel ruled against them.

He explained the decision to sanction the Defendant as follows:

“HEP’s conduct is wrongful in that it exchanged a thing of value for a crucial witness’s declaration contradicting the prior statements (truthful or not) alleged by HomeDirect in support of its claims against HEP. I note in particular that the conduct of Hewitt, CEO of HEP, demonstrated that his solicitation of this declaration was made out of desperation or near desperation in the face of Home’s complaint. The transaction was motivated out of fear of a witness’s testimony and not for purposes of resolving an overdue account receivable. Paying a crucial witness for the purpose to ensure they are useless to the opposing party is egregious.”

Additionally, Judge Zagel found that the lawyer for the defendant acted with incivility to the other lawyers in the case.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

www.clintonlaw.net

Lawyer Passes Note To Client In Deposition – Pro Hac Vice Admission Revoked


SIUPA v. ASTRA TECH, INC., Dist. Court, D. Massachusetts 2013 – Google Scholar.

This is a rare decision on a motion to reconsider the revocation of pro hac vice admission. A pro hac vice admission is one by leave of court for a lawyer who is not admitted to practice in that court. In rare cases the pro hac vice admission can be revoked where the lawyer engaged in some form of serious misconduct.

In this case the lawyer was accused of passing a note to his client during a deposition. The lawyer denied it, but the district judge held a hearing. The district judge found that the lawyer had, indeed, passed the note and had submitted a falsified exhibit to the court.

Lawyers know that they are not supposed to coach witnesses during a deposition. Here, the lawyer passed a note to the witness and, allegedly, lied about it.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.