Category: Rule 11 Sanctions

Another One Bites the Dust

Another One Bites the Dust

Once again, a lawyer has used generative AI to draft a brief, with embarrassing consequences. In Mid-Central Operating Engineers Health and Welfare Fund v. Hoosiervac, LLC SD Indiana 2025, the 2:24-cv-00326, a lawyer got into trouble for using Generative AI to draft a brief. The court that Rule 11 was violated and that there were violations of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct.

On October 29, 2024, attorney Ramirez filed a brief in support of Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider the Court’s Denial of Motion to Transfer. [Dkt. 65.] In that brief, Mr. Ramirez cited to In re Cook County Treasurer, 773 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2014)—a case the Undersigned was unable to locate. In response to the Undersigned’s Order to file a Notice with the correct citation, [Dkt. 82], Mr. Ramirez filed a Notice in which he stated that he was unable to locate the case, “acknowledge[d] that the referenced citation was in error,” “withdr[ew] the previously cited authority[,] and apologize[d] to the Court and opposing counsel for the confusion.” [Dkt. 86 at 1.]

On December 23, 2024, the Undersigned explained that “filing a brief with a non-existent citation falls far short of an attorney’s duty to the Court, his client, and opposing counsel.” [Dkt. 87.] Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(3), the Undersigned ordered Mr. Ramirez to appear in-person and show cause why he should not be sanctioned for violating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). Id. In that Order, the Undersigned noted that a non-exhaustive review of Mr. Ramirez’s other filings in this case revealed citations in two other briefs that the Undersigned was unable to locate: Knoedler Manufactuers, Inc. v. Cox, 545 F.2d 1033, 1035 (7th Cir. 1976), cited in [Dkt. 39]; and Brown v. Local 58, IBEW, 628 F.2d 441 (6th Cir. 1980), cited in [Dkt. 52].

On January 3, 2025, the parties in this matter appeared by counsel for a hearing on the Order to Show Cause. [Dkt. 88.] Mr. Ramirez admitted that he had relied on programs utilizing generative artificial intelligence (“AI”) to draft the briefs. Mr. Ramirez explained that he had used AI before to assist with legal matters, such as drafting agreements, and did not know that AI was capable of generating fictitious cases and citations. These “hallucination cites,” Mr. Ramirez asserted, included text excerpts which appeared to be credible. As such, Mr. Ramirez did not conduct any further research, nor did he make any attempt to verify the existence of the generated citations. Mr. Ramirez reported that he has since taken continuing legal education courses on the topic of AI use and continues to use AI products which he has been assured will not produce “hallucination cites.” Mr. Ramirez agreed during the hearing that he did not fully comply with Rule 11, but he emphasized that at no point did he act in bad faith or proceed with malice.

The court recommended a sanction of $15,000, one for each of the briefs with fake citations.

The court also found three violations of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct.

At least three of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct are implicated here, and the Undersigned will address them each in turn.

A. Rule 1.1. Competence

“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” Ind. R. of Prof. Conduct 1.1. It is clear that Mr. Ramirez failed to provide competent representation when he submitted false legal bases to the Court. These actions flouted the requisite legal knowledge, skill, preparation, and especially thoroughness reasonably necessary for Mr. Ramirez’s representation of his client.

B. Rule 3.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions

“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” Ind. R. of Prof. Conduct 3.1. This Rule mirrors the requirements of Rule 11(b)(2), and likewise proscribes presenting unfounded legal bases. There is no merit in relying on non-existent cases, so Mr. Ramirez’s conduct clearly disregards this Rule.

C. Rule 3.3. Candor Toward the Tribunal

“A lawyer shall not knowingly: . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.” Ind. R. of Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1). It is undisputed that Mr. Ramirez made false statements of law to the Court when in three separate submissions he relied on at least three cases which do not exist. Moreover, Mr. Ramirez did so “knowingly”—he knowingly failed to fulfill his duty of verifying that the law he presented was “good law.” As such, the Undersigned believes that discipline for violation of Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 is appropriate as well.

Conclusions: (a) Do your own work; (b) don’t use generative AI to draft briefs because it can hallucinate; (c) even if you use AI, make sure to check the end product against real cases.

Use of Generative AI Leads To An Order To Show Cause in Federal Court

Use of Generative AI Leads To An Order To Show Cause in Federal Court

This is the case of Coomer v. Lindell, No. 22-cv-01129, pending in federal court in Colorado. Mike Lindell’s lawyers used Generative AI to respond to a brief and filed it without cite-checking the brief. This District Court entered an order to Show Cause why they should not be sanctioned. Lawyers don’t understand that Generative AI will hallucinate cases if it cannot find the citations you want it to find. This is problem with Generative AI. It is also why AI is useful. This is a path towards creativity in AI. We can’t say it enough, “Don’t Do This!”

www.clintonlaw.net

Rule 11 Does Not Apply To Pre-Removal Pleadings

Rule 11 Does Not Apply To Pre-Removal Pleadings

Cases are often filed in state court and removed to federal court by a petition for removal. Can the defendant seek sanctions under Rule 11 for the pre-removal pleadings? Most Courts say “No.”

Rule 11 provides that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). And by presenting such a document to the Court, “whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it,” an attorney certifies that to the best of his or her knowledge it is not presented for an improper purpose, its legal contentions are warranted, and its factual contentions or denials of factual contentions have support. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). If a document violates one of these certifications, then the Court may sanction the attorney, law firm, or party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).

But “Rule 11 is an extraordinary remedy, one to be exercised with extreme caution.” Mason Classical Acad., Inc v. Arnn, No. 2:22-CV-513-JLB-NPM, 2023 WL 6196855, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2023) (citation omitted). This extraordinary remedy is inappropriate at this juncture for two reasons.

First, when a case is removed from state court (like here), “Rule 11 does not apply to pleadings filed before removal.” Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 26 F.3d 1089, 1091 (11th Cir. 1994). JM Family Defendants’ sanctions motion relies exclusively on the amended complaint filed in state court. (See, e.g., Doc. 48 at 13, 16 (reciting paragraphs of the amended complaint)). And, while post-removal advocacy can support Rule 11 sanctions, the Defendants’ motion does not rely on any of Plaintiff’s post-removal filings. This is problematic, as Rule 11 mandates that the sanction motion “describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (emphasis added).

The case is Lynch v. Filice, District. Court MD Florida 2025 2-24-cv-340-SPC-NPM. It is unpublished.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

Dershowitz Sanctioned By Arizona District Court

Dershowitz Sanctioned By Arizona District Court

On July 14, 2023, the District Court for Arizona issued an order denying Alan Dershowitz’ Application for an Order to Show Cause. The effect of this order is that Mr. Dershowitz was sanctioned by the district court for signing pleadings in the case captioned Kari Lake, et al. v. Adrian Fontes. No. 22-cv-00677-PHX-JJT. The plaintiff is a former candidate for governor of Arizona. The defendants are Maricopa county election officials.

The procedural history of the lawsuit is complicated. In April 2022, Lake filed suit against Maricopa County election officials to prohibit the use of electronic voting machines. The Court dismissed the case on August 22, 2022. Lake v. Hobbs, 623 F.Supp. 3d 1015 (D. Ariz. 2022). The Defendants moved for sanctions under Rule 11(b)(3). They “argued that Plaintiffs and their counsel made false allegations about Arizona elections in violation of Rule 11(b)(3) and brought this case for the improper purpose of ‘sowing doubts about the reliability and trustworthiness of elections for own financial and political benefit’ in violation of Rule 11(b)(1). Defendants further argued that the lawyers violated Rules 11(b)(2) and (3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. After briefing the court granted the motion and held that sanctions were warranted under Rule 11 and Section 1927. Dershowitz then filed an Application for Order to Show Cause to order the Maricopa Defendants to “show cause as to why an award of sanctions should be entered against Mr. Dershowitz personally or his consulting firm.” Dershowitz argued that his role in the matter was very limited and noted that he signed the complaint and first amended complaint as “of counsel.” Dershowitz argued that the words “of counsel” meant that his involvement was too limited for him to be sanctioned.

On May 20, 2022, the Maricopa Defendants sent Dershowitz and the other lawyers for Kari Lake a safe-harbor letter advising them that the Defendants believed the lawsuit was frivolous.

The District Court rejected Dershowitz’s argument that he did not violate Rule 11. To be sanctioned under Rule 11, the lawyer had to have signed the pleading. Here, Dershowitz signed both the original complaint and the amended complaint. By signing a complaint, the lawyer certifies that the filing is “not being presented for an improper purpose” and that the “legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a non frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law” and “the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” Once the lawyer signs the pleading, Rule 11 applies even if the lawyer later withdraws from the case.

The District Court rejected the argument that Dershowitz had very limited involvement in the case because Dershowitz did sign the complaint and the amended complaint. The Court also rejected Dershowitz’s argument that he was listed as “of counsel” on the Complaint. “A contrary ruling here could diminish the significance of attorney signatures and cause courts to question whether they can be relied upon with confidence. If would offer safe harbor to attorneys who designate themselves ‘of counsel’ no matter the inadequacy of the filings they sign.” p. 23.

“Failing to impose meaningful sanctions here might very well encourage others to follow suit by lending their credibility to documents filed in court without facing any real consequence if their certifications prove hollow or incomplete. The need for general deterrence is therefore significant.” p. 25.

The Court upheld the Rule 11 sanctions and the 28 U.S.C. §1927 sanctions against Dershowitz. Because of his limited involvement, the court held that Dershowitz would only be held responsible for 10% of the attorney fee award in favor of the Defendants. Dershowitz has the right to appeal the decision and the Ninth Circuit may view matters differently.

Comment: the opinion is thoughtful and well-written. Generally, sanctions cases come down to a number of factors. In this case, the Defendants warned the lawyers that Defendants believed the lawsuit was frivolous and the lawyers did not heed those warnings. Additionally, I agree with the Court’s holding that listing a lawyer as “of counsel” should not give that lawyer a defense to sanctions litigation. The opinion also recognizes the limited role that Dershowitz played in the litigation and it reduces his portion of the attorney fee award. Increasingly, courts and attorney disciplinary bodies have been highly unsympathetic to lawyers who made false allegations about voting machines and the conduct of recent elections. Courts may regard these lawsuits as a threat to the fabric of democracy. Numerous lawyers for former President Trump have been sanctioned by courts and subjected to attorney disciplinary investigations.

Before you sign a complaint, consider whether you have a factual basis to claim that the allegations in the complaint are true. If you do not have any such basis, do not sign. Ask yourself “Is there evidence that voting machines miscount votes or favor candidates of one party over another party?” Is the evidence credible or is it merely conjecture?

Filing Complaint Without Authorization of Client Leads to Rule 11 Sanctions

Filing Complaint Without Authorization of Client Leads to Rule 11 Sanctions

In Edwards v. Wells Fargo Bank, 19-cv-14409 D. New Jersey January 5, 2003, the Court awarded Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel for failing to obtain the authorization of his client before filing the case. At a hearing the lawyer conceded that he lacked authorization to file the case. It is difficult for me to comprehend the court’s rulings. The pertinent parts of the ruling are quoted below:

WHEREAS, the Court held a hearing on the Order to Show Cause on July 7, 2021, with both Thomas and Edwards in attendance, (ECF No. 29), and where Thomas conceded on the Record that Edwards had not hired him to bring this case and that in fact Thomas had never met Edwards prior to the Order to Show Cause hearing on July 7, 2021, (ECF No. 38 at 23:22-23); and

WHEREAS, the Court noticed Thomas at both the hearing and in the Order issued on July 8, 2021 that the Court was contemplating sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Professional Conduct and gave Thomas a second chance to Show Cause to the Court; and

WHEREAS, Thomas received two extensions and nearly two months of time to prepare his second response to the July 8, 2021 Order to Show Cause (ECF Nos. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37); and

WHEREAS, the Court found Thomas’ explanations as to why this case was brought under Edwards’ name were insufficient, (ECF No. 39); and

WHEREAS, the Court found that Thomas was not authorized by Edwards to bring this action, (ECF No. 39 at 34-35); and…

WHEREAS, the Court found that Thomas filed and pursued this lawsuit for improper purposes, violating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(1), (among other violations) (ECF No. 39 at 20-21)[2] (“the Court is unable to conceive of any proper basis Thomas could have had for filing this Complaint”) (emphasis in original); and

WHEREAS, with the Court finding a violation of Rule 11(b)(1), the case was brought improperly ab initio, without Edwards’ knowledge or consent;

No Rule 11 Sanctions Where Lawyers Had Reasonable Basis To Make Alter Ego Claim

No Rule 11 Sanctions Where Lawyers Had Reasonable Basis To Make Alter Ego Claim

In Jingdong Logistics United States Company v. Ready Acquisition, Inc, Case No. 5:22-cv-01018-ODW (SHKx), Central District of California, plaintiff alleged that Ready Acquisition was the alter ego of its two owners. The owners alleged that the allegations were baseless and sought Rule 11 sanctions. The court denied sanctions by reasoning that there was an adequate factual and legal basis for the alter ego claim.

Here, the Court finds that the alter ego allegations in Jingdong’s Complaint were neither factually nor legally baseless “at the time that the position [was] adopted,” that is, at the time Jingdong filed its Complaint. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986). In reaching this conclusion, the Court “avoid[s] using the wisdom of hindsight,” limiting its inquiry to whether a reasonable basis for alter ego allegations existed at the time the Complaint was filed, regardless of what Jingdong learned or discovered after it filed the Complaint. Id. at 1537 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment).

Prior to filing the Complaint, Jingdong’s attorneys investigated Ready Acquisition by sending a field agent to Ready Acquisition’s registered principal office address and to Lawrance’s personal address. (See Decl. Sijiu Ren ISO Opp’n (“Ren Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-5, ECF No. 22-1.) In so doing, Jingdong discovered that (1) Ready Acquisition’s office was occupied by new tenants, and that (2) packages addressed to Ready Acquisition were located on the front porch of Lawrance’s residence. (Id.; Decl. Greg Lawrance ISO Reply (“Lawrance Decl.”) ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 28.) Jingdong’s attorneys conducted additional research and determined that Ready Acquisition’s business status in the State of New Hampshire was “Not In Good Standing.” (Ren Decl. Ex. A (“Business Information Inquiry”), ECF No. 22-2; Ren Decl. ¶ 6.) These discoveries provided Jingdong’s counsel with a reasonable factual basis for including alter ego allegations against Lawrance and Gunter in Jingdong’s Complaint.

Lawrance and Gunter argue otherwise, pointing to facts and developments that occurred after Jingdong filed its Complaint, (Mot. 6-8), but these facts are not relevant to whether the Court should sanction Jingdong for allegations made in the Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b); Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1538.

Lawrance and Gunter further argue that Jingdong is withholding $400,000 of Ready Acquisition’s inventory and thus contributing to the very insolvency Jingdong alleges supports alter ego liability. (Reply 5.) This argument is not well taken because there is no actual evidence of a causal link between Jingdong’s withholding of inventory and Ready Acquisition’s purported insolvency; and in any case, this attack on one component of Jingdong’s alter ego theory, even if successful, would not render the alter ego theory factually or legally baseless.

The court also held that the legal theory did not merit sanctions either.

Comment: Plaintiff did an extensive investigation of the facts before it brought the alter ego claim. That investigation and the facts that were discovered was a sufficient basis to bring an alter ego claim.

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That Will Cost You $50,000.

That Will Cost You $50,000.

Trump v. Clinton is a purported RICO lawsuit filed by Trump attorneys against Hillary Clinton (who lost the 2016 Presidential Election) and a number of other defendants. It was dismissed with prejudice two months ago. One of the defendants, Charles Dolan, filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. The district court granted the motion with some stern words for Trump’s lawyers. Dolan was a mere volunteer for the Clinton campaign and did not have the roles that the complaint, and the amended complaint, alleged that he had.

The Court found that the allegations that Mr. Dolan was involved in a conspiracy to harm Donald Trump or his campaign were false and reckless. The court noted that the lawyers for Dolan sent a detailed warning letter to the attorneys for Trump explaining the various flaws with the Complaint. Instead of taking the letter seriously, the lawyers made a few cosmetic changes and filed an Amended Complaint. The court’s discussion of the Rule 11 warning letter is instructive:

The Warning Letter. 

On May 31, 2022, counsel for Mr. Dolan wrote the attorneys for Mr. Trump. They warned:

1.         That Mr. Dolan had no role in any conspiracy related to the Steele dossier.

2.         That Mr. Dolan was not a source for the allegations of sexual activity.

3.         That Mr. Dolan had not been in contact with any defendant other than Igor Danchenko, and that Mr. Dolan’s contacts with Mr. Danchenko involved business interests and help for a conference in Moscow.

4.         That Mr. Dolan had never been chairman of the DNC.

5.         That Ms. Clinton was on record through a spokesperson as stating she had no recollection of Mr. Dolan.

(DE 268-1).

The court then noted that the Amended Complaint did not make material changes to the allegations against Dolan. Dolan moved for sanctions. The explanation for the decision to grant sanctions is well-written.

Rule 11 sanctions are properly assessed (1) when a party files a pleading that has no reasonable factual basis; (2) when the party files a pleading that is based on a legal theory that has no reasonable chance of success and that cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to change existing law; or (3) when the party files a pleading in bad faith for an improper purpose. Massengale v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996)).

Here, all three are true. In Section A of this Order, I explain why the Amended Complaint lacked a reasonable factual basis as to the allegations against Defendant Dolan. Then, in Section B, I explain why Plaintiff’s legal arguments contained no reasonable chance of success. I have already done so, at great length and in great detail, in my Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. But I reiterate those fatal flaws here as relevant to the distinct Rule 11 inquiry. Finally, in Section C, I find that Plaintiff filed his pleadings for an improper purpose.

The order contains a lengthy discussion of the merits of the legal theories in the Complaint as additional bases for sanctions. The court ordered the lawyers for Trump to deposit $50,000 with the Court and pay Mr. Dolan’s legal fees in connection with the motion.

Comment: this is an example where the lawyer failed to conduct due diligence before making claims that were either false or baseless. Even after receiving a Rule 11 warning letter, the lawyers (at least according to the Court) failed to take any measures to correct the problems with the Complaint. Rule 11 requires due diligence and no lawyer should ever sign a pleading without doing that hard work. Don’t sign because the boss tells you to sign. Don’t sign to curry favor. Sign if the allegations are true and well-researched. In the end of the opinion, the Court indicated that other sanctions might be forthcoming.

Note: my apologies for the formatting issues that made the original post impossible to read.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

Trump v. Clinton – A Fertile Ground For Sanctions Motions

The Southern District of Florida recently dismissed Trump v. Clinton 2:22-cv-14102 (Middlebrooks, J.) which alleged a smorgasbord of grievances against various defendants who plaintiff claimed had attempted to rid the 2016 Presidential Election against him. Defendant Charles Halliday, Jr. filed the first of an expected dozen or so Rule 11 motions against the lawyers for the former President. The motion alleges sloppy work by Trump’s lawyers.

“Defendant Charles Halliday Dolan, Jr has been dragged into this lawsuit via speculation, rumor and innuendo.Large and small matters are falsely and cavalierly presented in Plaintiff’s pleadings; any one of these false statements is grounds for sanction.

The original complaint falsely presented Mr. Dolan as a former Chairman of the DNC. Complaint, ¶96.Undersigned counsel sent a Rule 11 letter to Plaintiff’s counsel noting, among other things, that statement was false.See Exhibit A. The Amended Complaint now describes

Mr. Dolan as the former Chairman of a “national democratic political organization.” Amended Complaint, ¶96. Thatdoes not fix the problem, as Mr. Dolan was never the Chairman of any such organization. Mr. Dolan’s resume is available online and could have been easily checked.

The new, Amended Complaint further complicates its prior error by now identifying Mr. Dolan for the first timeas a citizen and resident of New York, Amended Complaint, ¶20. This is a new allegation that is not true at all, andagain could have been easily checked. Mr. Dolan lives and has lived for most of his adult life in Virginia. Mr. Dolan already submitted a declaration identifying himself as an Arlington, Virginia resident.Mr. Dolan is alleged to be the ultimate source of a rumor that Mr. Trump engaged in salacious sexual activity at a Moscow hotel.This is also not true, and there is no basis for this rumor….

There was no factual basis to allege that Mr. Dolan was ever Chairman of the DNC, or former Chairman of any national democratic political organization, and no basis to allege he has ever been a resident of New York. There apparently was not a scintilla of due diligence on the part of the plaintiff’s attorneys. These false statements alone merit sanction, especially since undersigned counsel warned Plaintiff’s counsel of a potential Rule 11 motion via letter. These false facts are indicative of a lack of reasonable diligence generally.”

Comment: I take no position on whether the motion has merit, but will keep readers updated on the results of this (and other expected sanctions motions) in this case.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

A Nasty Letter Isn’t A Sanctions Motion

A Nasty Letter Isn’t A Sanctions Motion

Rule 11 has a safe harbor that allows the opposing party to withdraw an offending pleading within 21 days after he is served with the motion for sanctions. Many sanctions motions are denied because the party seeking sanctions writes a letter to the opponent, but does not actually serve a motion for sanctions. This court discussed this common problem and denied the motion for sanctions.

“Rule 11(b) provides that by presenting a pleading to a court, an attorney certifies that, after conducting a reasonable inquiry, evidentiary support exists for the factual allegations pled in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3). If a party believes that it has been served with a complaint for which no reasonable inquiry had been conducted, or for which no evidentiary support existed, then he may move for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). The movant may not, however, file the motion for sanctions with the court unless the motion has been served on the non-moving party at least twenty-one (21) days prior to filing, and the non-moving party has not withdrawn or otherwise corrected the challenged writing within the twenty-one-day period. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Compliance with the “21-day safe harbor” rule is a condition precedent to sanctions. RMC Publ’ns, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3:07-cv-3170-JFA, 2008 WL 11472127, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 2008) (citing Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng., Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 393 (4th Cir. 2004)).

There is no dispute that Defendant failed to serve the motion for sanctions and memorandum prior to filing it with the Court. Instead, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel on December 15, 2021, discussing the purported flaws in Plaintiff’s claims and demanding that she dismiss her claims with prejudice or Defendant “intends to file . . . a Rule 11 motion for sanctions…”. (Doc. No. 10-6, pp. 1, 6). Defendant argues that this letter satisfied the Rule 11 the safe harbor requirements. The Court disagrees. The Fourth Circuit has stated:

The requirements of the rule are straightforward: The party seeking sanctions must serve the Rule 11 motion on the opposing party at least twenty-one days before filing the motion with the district court, and sanctions may be sought only if the challenged pleading is not withdrawn or corrected within twenty-one days after service of the motion.

Brickwood, 369 F.3d at 389 (emphasis added); see also Hamlin v. TD Bank, No. 1:13-CV-00200-MR-DSC, 2014 WL 3101942, at *3, n.2 (W.D.N.C. July 4, 2014) (“The motion for sanctions must be served on the offending party at least twenty-one days before filing and must describe in detail the alleged offending conduct. Therefore, counsel’s letter threatening to file a motion for Rule 11 sanctions in the event that the motion to dismiss was granted was not sufficient to trigger the safe harbor provision of Rule 11(c)(2).”).”

McFee v. Carolina Pad, LLC, 3:21-cv-633-GCM (W.D. North Carolina February 15, 2022).

So the procedure is simple: prepare a motion for sanctions and serve it on the other party and wait 21 days before filing it with the court.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

Federal Judge Sanctions Lin Wood, Sidney Powell and other lawyers

Federal Judge Sanctions Lin Wood, Sidney Powell and other lawyers

In King v. Whitmer, No. 20-13134, Judge Linda Parker issued a 110 page opinion sanctioned several lawyers who filed the complaint and the amended complaint under Rule 11, the Court’s inherent authority and 28 U.S.C. §1927. This opinion is very significant and it may cause changes in the way election law is practiced in the future. The Court found that the allegations in the Complaint lacked a good faith basis in law and fact and that the lawyers vexatiously multiplied the proceedings. The court used every possible ground to support the sanctions award and made credibility findings.

A link to the opinion is here: https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ag/172_opinion__order_King_733786_7.pdf

At the time these lawsuits were brought, they appeared to me to be reckless and risky. It is one thing to allege that a voter was disenfranchised. It is another thing all together to allege that the entire election was a fraud.