The Fifth Circuit recently decided Fletcher v. Experian Information Solutions, LLC No. 25-00086, (January 6, 2026) itself an appeal dealing with a sanctions issue. Unfortunately, the court noticed potentially spurious or hallucinated citations in the reply brief and issued an order to show cause. On February 18, 2026, the court sanctioned counsel $2500. This is the pertinent discussion:

“But a problem remained. Counsel for plaintiff and a member of the Jaffer & Associates law firm, had filed a reply brief on appeal containing numerous inaccurate citations, quotations, and statements of fact. We issued a show-cause order, enumerating 16 instances of fabricated quotations and 5 additional serious misrepresentations of law or fact. We directed Counsel, the only attorney to sign the brief, to “explain whether and how she verified the accuracy of the propositions in her brief.” We strongly suspected that Counsel had used AI to draft a substantial portion—if not the entirety—of her brief. 

Counsel’s response was disappointing. She asserted that she had “relied on publicly available versions of the cases, which [she] believed were accurate.” Believing that response to be incredible on its face, the court directed Counsel to answer additional questions. Counsel answered these questions, noting that she “endeavored to answer each question directly and transparently.” We address each question and Counsel’s response in turn.

First, when asked when she became aware of the inaccuracies in the brief, Counsel replied that it was at the time of our show-cause order. We do not at this time have reason to doubt that Counsel first became aware of the inaccuracies when we pointed them out. Of course, if Counsel had discovered the inaccuracies in her reply brief in the three months between its submission and our show-cause order, she should have immediately alerted the court and sought leave to file a correct brief.

Second, when asked what “publicly available versions of the cases” had led to the inaccuracies described above, Counsel named several well-known legal databases. The court does not find it credible that these sources produced the hallucinated quotations that appeared in Counsel’s brief. The first source, Google Scholar, does not contain summaries of legal cases that could contain inaccurate quotes. While the second, third, and fourth sources—CourtListener, Justia, and FindLaw—do provide legal case summaries, we have reviewed the summaries for each case cited in Counsel’s reply brief, and the problematic quotations and propositions are nowhere to be found. The remaining two sources, Casetext, which has been spun off into Thomas Reuter’s CoCounsel, and vLex, are both generative AI products.

To the extent these products generated the inaccurate summaries, Counsel’s response is misleading in several respects. For one, in her initial response, Counsel stated that she relied on “publicly available versions of the cases” and that “certain paraphrased summaries did not match the reporter text.” Neither of these descriptions fairly characterizes an AI-generated sentence. In addition, if these products generated the hallucinated quotations, they are not fairly characterized as “free online case repositories,” the use of which phrase suggested that these quotations came from summaries posted that could lead others astray. Further, Counsel did not even mention AI in her first response to the court.

Third, when asked specifically about whether she used AI and how she verified the accuracy of the case citations, Counsel finally admitted to the use of AI, though she neglected to do so in her initial show-cause response. We do not find it credible that Counsel used AI solely to “help organize and structure [her] arguments and to break up overly long paragraphs.” Even when asked directly, Counsel did not explain the steps she took to verify the factual assertions in her brief, so the court concludes that she took none.

Fourth, when asked about inaccurate assertions of record facts, Counsel provided no explanation of how “publicly available sources” could have caused record facts to be inaccurate. She had two such factual misstatements in her reply brief.

Fifth, when asked how the paraphrased summaries caused the inaccurate citations and quotations, Counsel continued to attribute the inaccurate quotations to “paraphrased summaries,” which she claims to have “mistakenly believed . . . reflected the actual language of the cases.” However, Counsel did not point this court to a single one of those summaries. We have put tremendous effort into attempting to find where these summaries could be located and have been unable to find them. To the extent Counsel is referring to a case summary generated by AI as a “paraphrased summar[y],” her response is evasive, misleading, and sanctionable.

In sum, the court finds that Counsel used artificial generative intelligence to draft a substantial portion—if not all—of her reply brief and failed to check the brief for accuracy. It is also likely that she used artificial generative intelligence in her response to the show-cause order. Had Counsel accepted responsibility and been more forthcoming, it is likely that the court would have imposed lesser sanctions. However, when confronted with a serious ethical misstep, Counsel misled, evaded, and violated her duties as an officer of this court.

Modern generative AI may be a new technology, but the same sanctions rules apply, and the rules we have are well equipped to handle these types of cases.[10] First, Rule 46(c) allows us to discipline an attorney who practices before us for “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to comply with any court rule.” Discipline under Rule 46(c) may include monetary sanctions. In re Violation of Rule 28(d), 635 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see 16AA Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure § 3992.2 (5th ed. 2025).

Conduct “unbecoming a member of the bar” is broad and includes making frivolous arguments and misrepresenting facts or law. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 1999 WL 1330642, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 1999) (show-cause order under Rule 46(c) for misrepresenting “a critical fact relating to jurisdiction”); Waldon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Store No. 1655, 943 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar” includes “deliberately misleading the court or displaying egregious misjudgment”).

The conduct at issue in this case is certainly “unbecoming a member of the bar.” Fed. R. App. P. 46(c). As discussed above, Counsel failed to check her own brief before submitting it, leading her to repeatedly misrepresent the law to the court. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) and (c) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“The rule . . . require[s] litigants to `stop-and-think’ before initially making legal or factual contentions . . . . A litigant’s obligations . . . include reaffirming to the court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings and motions after learning that they cease to have any merit.”); Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 3.01 (“A lawyer shall not . . . assert or controvert an issue [in a proceeding], unless the lawyer reasonably believes that there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.”); Id. 3.03(a)(1) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal”); Id. 8.04(a)(3) (A lawyer shall not “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation”).

Second, we have the “inherent power to impose sanctions for abuse of the judicial process.” Anderson, 953 F.3d at 315; see also Amarsingh v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 2026 WL 352016 at *6 (10th Cir. Feb. 9, 2026) (noting a court’s inherent authority to sanction in the context of a brief with AI-hallucinated citations). Submitting a brief riddled with fabricated quotations and assertions is such an abuse. See Park, 91 F.4th at 615 (noting that an “attempt to persuade a court or oppose an adversary by relying on fake opinions is an abuse of the adversary system”). Counsel’s misleading the court as to the source of her errors further justifies sanctions under our inherent powers. See Ben E. Keith Co. v. Dining All., Inc., 80 F.4th 695, 703 (5th Cir. 2023) (affirming inherent-power sanctions where attorney discovered misrepresentation and failed to correct it).

We have recognized, in reviewing a district court’s sanctions order, that “an admonition by the court may be an appropriate sanction, in instances where the attorney’s sanctionable conduct was not intentional or malicious, where it constituted a first offense, and where the attorney had already recognized and apologized for his actions.” Jenkins v. Methodist Hosp. of Dallas, Inc., 478 F.3d 255, 265 (5th Cir. 2007) (reviewing Rule 11 sanctions). These factors do not counsel against sanctions here.

IT IS ORDERED that [the Attorney] shall pay $2,500 in sanctions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit within 30 days of this order.”

Comment: the lawyer was fortunate to avoid a more serious sanction. We must be ever vigilant about AI and spurious citations. Note: I removed the lawyer’s name from this post.

In Lifetime Well LLC v. IBSPOT.Com, Inc., No 25-5135 (E.D. Pa.) (January 26, 2026), the court imposed Rule 11 sanctions on two attorneys for using fake citations in a legal brief. This is a common situation. A large firm is retained to represent the defendant. None of its lawyers are admitted in the jurisdiction. The large firm hires local counsel, a local attorney who, in theory, is admitted to the bar of that local court.

The introduction: “Out-of-state website retailers sued in this federal court for trademark and intellectual property concerns may not have relationships with lawyers admitted to practice before us. The retailer company (who cannot defend itself in court without counsel) may ask their known counsel to find lawyers admitted to the Bar of our Court to act as co-counsel to defend claims against it. The members of the Bar of our Court then swear they will ensure the out-of-town counsel will fully comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure, our Local Rules, and the Judge’s Policies. We may then grant our Bar member’s motion allowing the out-of-town lawyer the privilege of specially appearing in our Court to assist the local counsel barred in this Court.

We today test the role of both sets of lawyers in the misuse of artificial intelligence in briefing. A member of the Bar of our Court moved to dismiss a trademark claim against a website retailer as co-counsel for a specially admitted New York lawyer. Our Bar member admittedly did not read or study the case law. He simply signed his name. The paper he signed along with the New York attorney contained at least eight false case citation hallucinations generated by artificial intelligence. Our talented lawyers in Chambers caught these hallucinations and we directed counsel to show cause as to why we should not impose sanctions. New York co-counsel responded by firing a new lawyer in her office who played some role in preparing the briefing who used artificial intelligence in this case and at least two others. The New York senior lawyer did not explain why she did not catch or perform the basic due diligence in reading the cases in a Memorandum prepared by an attorney under her supervision. She also did not explain why she did not use this mistake as a lesson rather than a reason to fire the new lawyer. She also placed her local co-counsel at risk of sanction without cite checking or reading the cases in the Memorandum. She asked him to sign and file. Both attorneys admit this regrettable lapse in diligence. They both issued updated policies governing their use of artificial intelligence. We find both attorneys violated the obligations owed to the Court and their colleagues forced to track down authorities. They presented false case citations and admittedly did so without checking the artificial intelligence.”

The facts were somewhat ordinary. The out-of-state lawyers hired local counsel to assist them. Local Counsel trusted them and filed a legal brief that they had sent to him. Local counsel did not cite check the brief. Had he done so, he would have noticed that the citations were to nonexistent cases.

This is the court’s discussion of the conduct of Lead Counsel: “Lead Counsel submitted a brief containing citations to fake opinions—authorities which did not stand for the propositions asserted, arose from inapposite jurisdictions, or included inaccurate quotations. She signed the Motion and certified compliance with Rule 11. She did not personally double check the Motion to validate all case citations or to ensure the ultimate accuracy of the filling. Lead Counsel’s defense her firm’s new lawyer used artificial intelligence “unbeknownst” to her firm “rings completely hollow, because [Lead Counsel] had a duty to know by reviewing the document before signing her name to it. Her decision to knowingly sign a brief that she had not meaningfully reviewed was hers and hers alone.”

Opposing counsel then identified a false quotation in the Motion in its Opposition and on the same day Anderson and Associates staff discovered the law clerk who performed the legal research for the Motion had used artificial intelligence without disclosure in two unrelated cases. Lead Counsel and her firm did not review the Motion for additional citation errors. They did not question the law clerk about the research underlying the Motion. Lead Counsel instead filed a reply brief one week later and waited until we identified multiple false citations the next day. Lead Counsel had the opportunity to review the filing, identify erroneous citations, and notify us. The burden should not have fallen on us to expend judicial resources identifying blatantly false cites.

Only after we issued our Order to show cause did Lead Counsel follow up with the new lawyer about the citations in the Motion. The law clerk provided a spreadsheet explaining the cited authorities. Lead Counsel reports “at least two [artificial intelligence] detectors indicated that the case explanations . . . given by the Law Clerk . . . were also 100% [artificial intelligence] generated.” Lead Counsel’s response identifies no point at which she examined the cited authorities, confirmed their existence, or assessed whether they supported the propositions asserted in the Motion. Even after we raised concerns, Lead Counsel’s response describes the use of automated tools to evaluate the law clerk’s work rather than independent review of the case law.”

The court sanctioned Lead Counsel $4000.

The court was perhaps kinder to Local Counsel. The court explains: “We first address Local Counsel’s emphasis on the Motion’s asserted non-frivolous substance and partial success. This framing misses the point. The presence of some meritorious arguments does not excuse the inclusion of others supported by inaccurate, misleading, or fictitious citations. The Supreme Court through Rule 11 asks whether an attorney conducted a reasonable inquiry before signing and filing each legal contention presented to us. Nor does partial success relieve this Chambers of the burden of independently verifying and scrutinizing legal authority certified as accurate by Attorneys Anderson and Goldin. We were required to identify and disregard numerous fabricated citations before reaching the merits of any argument. Rule 11 exists to ensure courts may rely on the accuracy of the legal authority presented to them, not to excuse errors because some arguments ultimately succeed. We cannot excuse false citations because we partially granted the requested relief; we do not allow false submissions when the arguments do not prevail but excuse them if the arguments prevail.

Local Counsel erred in material respects. But the most glaring is based on his near-blind acceptance of papers drafted by an attorney not admitted to the Bar of this Court and his filing of those papers under his own name without checking the cited legal authority. Local counsel is not a rubber stamp. Local Counsel accepted another attorney’s work product without performing basic due diligence and then signed his name to this work product.

At the same time Local Counsel has stepped forward. He accepted responsibility and completed continuing legal education. We find no basis he will continue to engage in local counsel practice at this apparently one-time level of disregard. But Rule 11 sanctions serve not only to address past conduct. They exist to deter repetition of similar conduct by others. Local Counsel’s conduct and today’s sanction upon him serve as an important lesson for lawyers serving as local counsel.

We find a non-monetary sanction is most appropriate as an instructional measure. Local Counsel shall send a cover letter to the President of the Philadelphia Intellectual Property Lawyers Association enclosing today’s Order, this Memorandum, and his artificial intelligence policy and respectfully advise the President of our request these attachments be shared with the Association’s membership during its next Association membership meeting as a lesson on the risks of artificial intelligence and the duties of local counsel as members of the Bar of this Court.”

Note: I removed the names of the lawyers involved from this blog post. The purpose of this blog is to instruct and warn lawyers, not to call people out or embarrass them. I’m sure both lawyers regret this error and have taken steps to make sure it does not happen again.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.