Patel v. Stewartson, No. 2:23-cv-00873-APG-NJK (D. Nev. July 25, 2026) (Gordon, C.J.)
Posture. Kashyap Patel and the Kash Foundation sued Jim Stewartson for defamation, injurious falsehood, and business disparagement based on X and Substack posts made between June 2021 and May 2023 (accusing Patel of planning 1/6, sedition, being a “Kremlin asset,” etc.). Stewartson never defended despite actual knowledge of the suit, and the court entered default judgment. He then moved to set it aside under Rule 60(b)(1) and (b)(4) and to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2). The court granted both motions and dismissed.
Rule 60(b)(4) is one of six enumerated grounds in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding. Subsection (b)(4) provides simply that the court may grant relief where “the judgment is void.”
That four-word text carries a good deal of doctrinal freight, most of which the Stewartson order rehearses:
Narrow scope. A judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous, and (b)(4) is not a substitute for appeal. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270–71 (2010). Relief is available only in “the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.” For jurisdictional defects, the standard is whether the rendering court lacked even an “arguable basis” for jurisdiction — not whether it got the question right.
Nondiscretionary. Unlike the other subsections, (b)(4) admits of no balancing. “Either a judgment is void or it is valid.” Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp., 614 F.2d at 1256. If void, the court has a duty to grant relief, which is why the Falk v. Allenfactors and the fee-conditioning practice both dropped out of the Stewartson analysis.
Timing. Rule 60(c)(1) requires (b)(1)–(b)(3) motions to be brought within a year. Motions under (b)(4) are subject only to the “reasonable time” requirement, and most courts — including the Ninth Circuit — have held that a void judgment can be attacked at essentially any time, since a nullity does not ripen into validity through delay. That is what made Stewartson’s three-year silence largely costless to him.
Rule 60(b)(4) framework. The court reached only (b)(4). Two doctrinal points worth noting:
- The Falk v. Allen factors (prejudice, meritorious defense, culpability) do not apply to (b)(4) motions — void-judgment analysis is nondiscretionary. Internet Solutions, 509 F.3d at 1165; Thomas P. Gonzalez, 614 F.2d at 1256.
- A defaulting defendant retains his personal jurisdiction objection until affirmatively waived; Stewartson raised it in his first appearance. Am. Ass’n of Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst.
The burden question. The court had ordered supplemental briefing on who bears the prima facie burden on minimum contacts when a defendant with actual notice moves under 60(b)(4) — an open question in the circuit. It ducked the issue: the result was the same either way. If Stewartson bore the burden, his declaration (posting from California, no Nevada contacts since a 2016 UFC event, no interest in plaintiffs’ Nevada ties) made the showing. If plaintiffs bore it, they failed.
Merits — express aiming under Calder. Prongs one (intentional act) and three (knowledge of harm in forum) were satisfied or undisputed. The case turned entirely on express aiming, and Walden v. Fiore did the work:
- Tagging Patel — who happened to be a Nevadan — in posts unrelated to Nevada activities creates a contact with the plaintiff, not the forum. “The plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.”
- Generally accessible websites require “something more” (Cybersell). Plaintiffs pleaded no Nevada subscribers to the Substack or podcast, and no Nevada-targeted advertising — distinguishing Mavrix Photo.
- The posts were aimed at “the American body politic writ large,” not a Nevada audience.
- Calder and Burri Law v. Skurla were distinguished on the same ground: in both, the forum was the focal point of the challenged statements and the conduct they described. Here Stewartson never accused Patel of conduct inNevada.
- The damages expert opined on local, national, and international reputational harm but never quantified jurisdictionally significant harm in Nevada.
Relatedness. As an alternative holding, even if Stewartson’s Nevada-flavored posts (criticizing Caesars Palace, and Jesse Binnall flipping “fake electors”) counted as purposeful availment, the claims failed the but-for relatedness test — he could have made the identical defamatory statements about Patel without ever posting about Nevada.
Fees. The court flagged, sua sponte, that it likely lacks discretion to condition a (b)(4) set-aside on payment of fees, since vacatur of a void judgment is a nondiscretionary duty. It then made a pointed record: had it possessed that discretion, it would have awarded fees — Stewartson knew of the suit, apparently evaded service, mocked plaintiffs online, “wasted the plaintiffs’ and the court’s time, and I do not commend his actions.”
The practical lesson for plaintiff-side counsel is that a default judgment obtained on shaky jurisdictional footing is worth very little — three years of litigation and an entered judgment evaporated on a motion the defendant could file at any time, with none of the equitable considerations that would normally cut against a defaulting party available to save it. The other practical lesson for plaintiff is to sue in the correct court, one with personal jurisdiction. It is a waste of time and money to sue in a questionable forum. If Plaintiff had sued the blogger where the blogger lived, the result might have been different.